
By Mata Press Service
Canada has become an attractive operating ground for international criminal networks that exploit its open economy, financial system and weaknesses in law enforcement to move illegal drugs, launder money and infiltrate legitimate businesses, according to a new report.
The warning comes amid growing concerns about criminal operations linking Chinese chemical suppliers, Mexican drug cartels and North American distributors, as well as the involvement of foreign state actors in organized crime.
In a report published by the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, Laura Dawson, executive director of the Future Borders Coalition, says Canada's traditional approach to border security is failing to keep pace with criminal organizations operating across countries, industries and financial systems.
"Canada's openness, expansive trading relationships, stable institutions, sophisticated financial system, extensive transportation infrastructure, and close access to the United States and Mexico are enormous advantages for legitimate commerce," Dawson writes.
"Those same features can be exploited by criminal networks."
The report, Beyond the Border: Disrupting Criminal Networks, calls for Canadian authorities to move beyond individual drug seizures and arrests to dismantle the financial, commercial and transportation systems supporting international crime.
Dawson points to criminal networks linked to China, Mexico, Iran and other countries that have exposed weaknesses in Canada's intelligence-sharing, enforcement capacity and legal systems.
The warning is particularly relevant to British Columbia, where the Cullen Commission's investigation into money laundering exposed how criminal proceeds flowed through casinos, real estate and other sectors of the provincial economy.
"Canada can be a destination, a production location, a financial centre, and a transit or export platform," Dawson writes.
According to the 2025 Public Report on Organized Crime in Canada, authorities assessed 493 organized crime groups, including eight considered high-level national threats.
The intelligence report identified the United States, Mexico, Colombia, the United Arab Emirates, China and Australia among the leading countries connected to Canadian criminal organizations.
It also found that 58 per cent of assessed groups were associated with legitimate businesses through ownership, employment or exploitation, enabling them to conceal illegal activities.
One of the most serious threats highlighted by Dawson is the international fentanyl trade, which connects chemical suppliers in Asia with drug manufacturers and distributors across North America.
China has been identified by American and Canadian authorities as a major source of precursor chemicals used to manufacture fentanyl, the powerful synthetic opioid responsible for thousands of overdose deaths.
Dawson says a single supply chain may involve Chinese chemical suppliers, manufacturers directed by Mexican cartels and distributors operating in Canada and the United States.
These networks often use legitimate commercial channels to transport chemicals and equipment that also have lawful industrial uses.
"Viewed individually, many transactions appear unremarkable," Dawson writes.
Chemicals may arrive through seaports, courier services, postal systems or commercial cargo before being diverted into illegal drug production, making detection difficult without intelligence linking the shipments to criminal organizations.
The report also examines connections between foreign governments and organized crime.
It cites research suggesting that governments, including China, Russia and Iran, have used criminal networks to advance state interests, although the relationships vary.
Dawson notes that a U.S. congressional investigation linked the Chinese Communist Party to tax rebates, grants and ownership interests benefiting companies involved in the fentanyl trade. However, the party had not been implicated in specific fentanyl transactions.
Ottawa has been seeking closer international cooperation to stop precursor chemicals from reaching criminal manufacturers.
A federal government update says China introduced new export controls in May 2026 on certain chemicals destined for Canada, the United States and Mexico. India also agreed to strengthen intelligence-sharing and law-enforcement cooperation to combat their diversion.
Dawson argues that the threat extends beyond fentanyl physically crossing the Canada-U.S. border.
Her report cites U.S. Customs and Border Protection figures showing that 4.8 pounds of fentanyl were seized at the northern border between September 2025 and August 2026, compared with 10,200 pounds at the southern border.
Although direct seizures at the Canadian border represent a small fraction of the American total, the networks supplying chemicals, financing production and distributing drugs remain a shared North American threat.
The report warns that international criminal organizations increasingly operate through apparently legitimate businesses, with different groups handling transportation, financing, forged documents, warehousing and distribution.
Dawson cites Project Chickadee, an investigation led by the Ontario Provincial Police and Canada Border Services Agency that uncovered an international operation exporting stolen Canadian vehicles to the Middle East and Africa.
The network used sophisticated vehicle theft technology, fraudulent customs documents and export arrangements. Financial intelligence helped investigators connect its operations, requiring cooperation among more than 30 authorities.
Dawson says the case demonstrates why investigators must follow the money and examine business ownership rather than concentrate solely on goods crossing borders.
Criminal infiltration can also increase costs for legitimate traders, distort competition and expose sensitive financial and transportation infrastructure.
"A legitimate company cannot compete on equal terms with a business financed by criminal proceeds or one that is used primarily as a vehicle for laundering money," she writes.
Dawson is particularly critical of gaps between Canada's intelligence agencies, police forces, border authorities and financial regulators.
She argues that criminal organizations can move across jurisdictions and adapt their operations faster than government agencies can coordinate their responses.
The report calls for closer cooperation among the RCMP, Canada Border Services Agency, intelligence services, financial regulators, provincial police, Indigenous authorities and American law-enforcement agencies.
It also recommends better intelligence-sharing, technology to identify criminal connections and secure channels for businesses to report suspicious transactions.
For Canada, a major Pacific trading nation with extensive commercial relationships across Asia, the findings raise questions about protecting international supply chains without disrupting legitimate trade.
Dawson cautions against indiscriminate border inspections that impose unnecessary costs on lawful businesses and travellers.
Instead, she wants authorities to identify the individuals financing and controlling criminal networks, including those using legitimate businesses as cover.
The report concludes that stronger political leadership and sustained cross-border cooperation are essential to preventing international criminal organizations from becoming more deeply entrenched in Canada's economy.
"This may be a difficult sell when political tensions with the United States are high, but the bad actors will not delay," Dawson warns.
"The longer we wait to disrupt those networks, the harder and more costly they become to dislodge."